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Do FASB’s Extended Adoption Windows Provide to Managers a Sandbox in Which 
They Can Play with Their Earnings? 
Introduction  
Reliable financial information is one cornerstone of a successful market economy 
in that it allows successful firms to distinguish themselves from poor performers (Healy 
& Whalen, 1999). Indeed, Enron has undoubtedly reminded the financial community of 
the critical importance reliable financial information plays in affecting the success of the 
capital markets. Unfortunately, managers’ goals (i.e., maximizing bonuses or 
performance ratings [Guidy et al, 1999]) often conflict with financial statement users’ 
goals (e.g., receiving financial information that is verifiable, neutral, and 
representationally faithful). As a result, published financial statements often reflect a 
certain degree of  “earnings management” (e.g., Bruns and Merchant, 1990). 
Past research suggests that extended adoption windows associated with new 
FASB pronouncements provide to companies an additional tool they can use to manage 
earnings (Gujarathi & Hoskin, 1992).  Extended adoption windows can afford 
management the opportunity to adopt a standard early, either when the effects of the 
change in accounting principle are positive and will enhance reported earnings, or when 
the effects of the change in accounting principle are severely negative and will further 
reduce earnings in a poor year (i.e., the “big bath theory” [Kinney and Trezevant, 1997]).  
In light of these results, it is not surprising that leaders from both the professional 
and academic communities have begun to question the ethics of earnings management 
and the extent to which managers should be allowed to use judgment in reporting 
earnings. Schipper (1989), for example, questions whether accounting rules should “be 
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promulgated in such a way that opportunities for earnings management are eliminated” to 
reduce the opportunities companies have to engage in earnings management. Similarly, 
James Leisenring, while still a member of the FASB remarked, “we can’t give the 
preparer community a sandbox in which to play with their earnings” (1994). Despite 
these suggestions, recent FASB pronouncements have afforded preparers an extended 
adoption window, allowing them the opportunity to “early adopt” statement provisions.  
Previous studies have looked for evidence of earnings management in early 
adoption, or reported about the market effects of early adoption. We consider here not 
only managements’ decision to become an early adopter of a new standard, but also how 
that decision is affected by market expectations of bad news and investor tolerance for 
earnings management, and the ramifications of the early adoption decision for standard 
setting. Specifically, in this exploratory study, we examine managers’ propensity to early-
adopt the provisions of SFAS 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets (FASB, 2001) 
in light of differing levels of market acceptance of bad news and tolerance for earnings 
management.  
This example provides an especially interesting study of the early adoption 
decision for two reasons. First, in large part owing to the complexity of the new standard, 
FASB expected very few companies to early adopt the provisions of SFAS 142. This 
suggests that those companies early adopting the provisions of SFAS 142 had not only 
the resources, but also a compelling reason to do so. Second, because the early adoption 
window spans the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Enron collapse, and their 
related effects on the economy there were differences in the market’s expectation for bad 
news as well as investors’ tolerance for earnings management. As a result, we question 
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whether management’s decision to early adopt or not to early adopt SFAS 142 was 
affected by the economic and political fallout from these unique events, and evaluate the 
FASB’s extended adoption policy in light of the results. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows: we briefly review relevant literature in the next section; we analyze an 
exploratory sample of early adopters of SFAS 142 in the section following that; and we 
conclude with a discussion evaluating FASB’s policy of allowing extended adoption 
windows.  
Literature Review 
Earnings Management 
According to Healy and Whalen (1999, 368), “Earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting…to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” This 
definition implies that managers’ actions to mislead shareholders are deliberate and 
therefore contain an ethical dimension (e.g., Blasi 1980). Indeed, because Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) report that at least some investors appear to be fooled by the earnings 
management, the practice cannot be perceived as neutral.  
In like manner, the SEC does not view earnings management in a neutral light. 
Then-chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, declared “war” on earnings management in a 
September 1998 speech in New York to a group of CPAs, lawyers and academics 
(Loomis, 1999). According to Loomis, the key problem associated with earnings 
management is that it obscures facts about the business. Indeed, earnings management is 
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particularly problematic during economic downturns when it can hide the fact that the 
company is in severe financial difficulty. 
Although the accounting literature does not focus on the ethical dimension of the 
early-adoption decision, it generally recognizes the existence of earnings management. 
Ronen and Sadan’s (1981) landmark study on income smoothing provides conclusive 
evidence of the practice. More recently, Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) review of the 
earnings management research reports that there is evidence that companies “window-
dress financial statements prior to public securities’ offerings, to increase corporate 
managers’ compensation and job security, to avoid violating lending contracts, or to 
reduce regulatory costs or to increase regulatory benefits” (p. 371). Unfortunately, while 
Healy and Wahlen provide information about the specific accruals that are most prone to 
earnings management, they do not report about the association between earnings 
management and the decision choice involved in managers’ decision to early adopt (or 
not early adopt) the provisions of newly issued FASB statements. 
Early Adoption and Earnings Management 
 In recent years, the FASB has passed standards with multi-year adoption 
windows, allowing managers the discretion to select early adoption. For instance, SFAS 
87 allowed a five-year adoption window; SFAS 96 allowed a five-year adoption window 
after various extensions; SFAS 106 allowed a four-year adoption window (Amir & Zev, 
1997a); and SFAS 133 allowed a three-year adoption window.  Most recently, the FASB 
has again allowed a multi-year adoption window for SFAS 142. As reported above, 
Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992) suggest this policy provides to preparers an additional tool 
managers can use to manage earnings. Unfortunately, prior research analyzes only the 
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financial statement effects of the early adoption of many of these extended adoption 
statements and not whether market acceptance of bad news or investors’ tolerance for 
earnings management associate with managers’ propensity to manage earnings using the 
early adoption decision. In most cases, the studies have found that companies who adopt 
standards early do so to boost reported earnings.  
  However, not all early adopters boost their earnings by the change in accounting. 
For these companies, two alternative earnings management techniques may explain their 
decisions to adopt early. The “big bath” theory (Kinney and Trezevant, 1997) suggests 
that in particularly bad earnings years, management may choose to report additional bad 
news, so as to create a situation in which the next period’s results will almost certainly be 
an improvement. The existence of the big bath has been borne out in the literature. Elliott 
and Shaw’s (1988) study of discretionary write-offs supported the theory, as did Healy’s 
(1985) study of management bonuses. Alternatively, McNichols and Wilson (1988) 
suggest that some companies may purposely report bad news in extremely good earnings 
years so as to smooth out the earnings stream over time.  
SFAS 87 
In separate studies of early adopters of SFAS 87 on pensions, Norton (1988), 
Stone and Ingram (1988), and Senteney and Strawser (1990) all find that the early 
adopters were able to drastically reduce current pension expense by adopting the new 
standard. Similarly, in a test of eight reasons for the early adoption of SFAS 87, Langer 
and Lev (1993) find that the only way to discriminate between early and late adopters 
was that the early adopters increased reported earnings. 
SFAS 96 
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Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992) find further evidence of earnings management in a 
review of the early adoption for SFAS 96 on deferred income taxes: they find that for the 
vast majority of their sample companies, earnings were increased by early adoption of the 
provisions of SFAS 96. Similarly, Simon and Costigan (1996) find a positive effect on 
current year’s income for 70% of companies that chose to early-adopt the provisions of 
SFAS 96, and that this group was more highly leveraged and more likely to have suffered 
an earnings decline than a control group. 
SFAS 106 
Costello et al (1994) review the effect of early adoption of SFAS 106 on Other 
Post-Employment Benefits (OPEB) for sixty-one early adopters. Results in their study 
differed in several ways from those reported in the studies above. First, they found that 
fewer firms were early adopters for SFAS 106 than for other standards that offered early 
adoption. They offered two possible explanations for this. One, a large amount of data 
needed to be gathered in order to implement the standard, limiting the option of adopting 
early to larger firms. (This was consistent with findings from Senteney and Strawser 
[1990] as well as Langer and Lev [1993] indicating that size is a factor in the decision to 
early adopt because larger firms have a greater ability to use consultants and generate 
internal data.) Two, Costello et al. (1994) suggest the possibility that fewer firms were 
early adopters for SFAS 106 because the effect on earnings of adopting SFAS 106 was 
negative for almost all companies, so that the primary incentive for early adoption noted 
above, to boost reported earnings, did not apply. 
Second, Costello et al (1994) find that most early adopters had smaller than 
average pension obligations, and that 25% of their sample of early adopters used a higher 
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than average discount rate in order to reduce the amount of the obligation to be recorded.  
This was somewhat consistent with the boosting earnings theory. 
Finally, twenty of the fifty-four sample companies that chose to recognize the full 
transition obligation in the year of adoption would have reported a net loss even without 
the effects of the accounting change. This finding provides support for the big bath 
theory. 
Amir and Ziv (1997b) confirm the findings of Costello et al. (1994) with respect 
to early adoption of SFAS 106. That is, in Amir and Ziv’s (1997b) study, firms with 
favorable information to report to the market as a result of the accounting change, relative 
to other firms, were more likely to be early adopters. This suggests the importance of 
boosting earnings in management’s decision to early-adopt the provisions of SFAS 106. 
Earnings Management and Accounting Ethics 
Merchant and Rockness (1994) were among the first to analyze the ethics of 
earnings management. They concluded that earnings management was “probably the 
most important ethical issue facing the accounting profession” (p. 92).  Despite this, 
research finds that opinions on the acceptability of earnings management vary 
considerably. Both Bruns and Merchants (1990) and Fischer and Rosenzweig (1994) find 
that the groups included in their surveys (students as well as practitioners) had greater 
tolerance for operating expense manipulation than accounting manipulation. More 
recently, in a test in which MBA students were assigned the role of either manager or 
shareholder, Kaplan (2001) reports inconclusive results. 
Based on our review of the literature, the evidence suggests companies early-
adopt the provisions of new FASB standards for one of three reasons. The first and most 
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likely reason companies choose to early-adopt the provisions of new FASB standards is 
to boost reported earnings. Secondary reasons for early adoptions are to enhance reported 
losses (i.e., take a “big bath”), or to reduce reported earnings in an otherwise particularly 
good year (i.e., to smooth income).  Indeed, in a review of a large sample of companies 
reporting “special items”1 over the ten years from 1981-1991, Kinney and Trezevant 
(1997) provide evidence that all three of these earnings management techniques – 
reporting items so as to boost earnings, to contribute to a big bath or, to smooth earnings 
– are in use. The big bath results, they suggest, because companies facing large earnings 
declines often cannot find enough special items with positive income impact to recognize 
in order to boost earnings as desired, (Kinney and Trezevant, 1997). 
Despite these findings, no study considers the impact of market acceptance of 
“bad news” on managers’ decisions to early adopt an accounting standard. There is 
evidence that the preparer community manages earnings to meet earnings forecasts (e.g., 
Kasznik, 1999) which suggests that market expectations for “bad news” may associate 
with managers’ propensity to engage in earnings management.  That is, managers’ 
propensity to report negative financial information may increase as market expectations 
of negative results (i.e., “bad news”) increases.  We investigate here whether market 
expectations about reported results affect managers’ propensity to early adopt the 
provisions of a newly issued FASB statement. Formally stated, Research Question 1 is: 
 
Research Question 1: Does level of market acceptance of “bad news” affect 
managers’ propensity to early adopt the provisions of an accounting standard? 
 
                                                 
1
 Special items are those that are either infrequent or unusual, but not both. 
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Further, despite recognition that investors tolerate a certain amount of earnings 
management (e.g., Healy and Wahlen 1999), prior research fails to consider whether 
investor tolerance for earnings management associate with managers’ decision to adopt a 
new FASB statement early. That is, one might expect a positive association between 
managers’ propensity to engage in earnings management and investor tolerance for 
earnings management. Accordingly, in this paper, we investigate whether investor 
tolerance for earnings management affect managers’ propensity to early adopt the 
provisions of a newly issued FASB statement. Formally stated, Research Question 2 is: 
 
Research Question 2: Does level of investor tolerance for earnings management 
affect managers’ propensity to early adopt the provisions of an accounting 
standard? 
 
In investigating these questions, it is important for us to also consider the effects 
of other factors previously associated with earnings management in the literature. For 
instance, because results in the literature (e.g., Amir and Ziv, 1997b; Costello et al, 1994; 
Langer and Lev, 1993; Simon and Costigan, 1996) suggest the company’s ex ante 
financial picture together with the direction of the impact of adopting the new FASB 
standard may interact in affecting the propensity of managers to early adopt the 
provisions of a new standard, care must be taken to consider these factors in our 
investigation. 
In addition, it is important for us to also consider company size. That is, prior 
research indicates that the more complex the new standard, the more time and expertise 
that may be required for adoption (e.g., Costello et al., 1994; Langer and Lev, 1993; 
Senteney and Strawser, 1990). This suggests that larger companies with greater financial 
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resources may have more flexibility than smaller companies in choosing to early-adopt 
newly issued FASB pronouncements.  
An Exploratory Sample of Early Adopters of SFAS 142 
Sample Selection 
To assess the degree to which managers decisions to early-adopt the provisions of 
a new FASB standard relate to market acceptance of bad news and investor tolerance for 
earnings management, we undertook an exploratory study of companies early adopting 
the provisions of SFAS 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets (FASB, 2001).2  The 
study became markedly more interesting when the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
and the collapse of Enron both occurred during its early adoption window. This afforded 
us the opportunity to study previously unstudied aspects of earnings management using 
early adoption.  Market acceptance of bad news could be assessed in the pre/post 
September 11th periods, while investor tolerance for earnings management could be 
assessed in the pre/post Enron periods. 
For instance, an August 18, 2001 AP Newswire story reporting about the day’s 
market activity concluded, “The sharp sell-off [today] was an indication that investors are 
relinquishing their hopes that business will get better by the end of 2001” (Baldwin, 
2001: http://detnews.com/2001/business/0108/20/-272223.htm). This headline suggests 
that in August, investors were prepared for “bad news” about corporate profits. After the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was another sharp sell-off of stock (Tsao, 
2001), suggesting that in the post-September 11th period investors were even more 
prepared for “bad news” about corporate profits than they were prior to the pre-
                                                 
2
 We chose to examine early-adopters for SFAS 142 because the FASB had initially expected few early 
adoptions of this standard as a result of the impact on earnings of expected impairment losses. 
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September 11th time period. Accordingly, the post-September 11th period represents a 
period of higher tolerance for “bad news” than the pre-September 11th period. As a result, 
we evaluate Research Question 1 by investigating those companies who announced early-
adoption of the provisions of SFAS before and after September 11, 2001. 
Although the Enron collapse began unraveling prior to October 31, 2001 when the 
SEC inquiry was upgraded to a formal investigation (Knox, 2001), onset of the formal 
SEC investigation brought to light the role accounting and reporting irregularities played 
in the company’s demise. As a result of the negative publicity attached to accounting 
shenanigans associated with Enron’s collapse, investors would expect higher quality 
financial information in the period following October 31than they would in the period 
prior to October 31, 2001. That is, investors would likely tolerate more earnings 
management in the period prior to October 31, 2001 than they would in the period 
following October 31, 2001. As a result, we evaluate Research Question 2 by 
investigating those companies who announced early-adoption of the provisions of SFAS 
before and after the October 31, 2001 announcement of the SEC’s formal investigation of 
Enron. 
Our sample was drawn from Internet press releases on the early adoption of SFAS 
142 identified through an advanced search on Google for “goodwill early adoption.” 
Fourteen early adopters were identified in the first 100 “hits.” Our unorthodox sample 
technique reflects the unusual nature of the adoption window. The adoption window for 
SFAS 142 was still open at the time the sample was gathered. However, the September 
11th terrorist attacks and the Enron collapse provided an unusual opportunity to look at 
certain aspects of early adoption. Accordingly, we decided to go ahead with this 
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exploratory sample in order to provide preliminary evidence on the early adoption of 
SFAS 142 in a timely manner. 
Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics for the fourteen companies in our sample appear in Table 1. 
The companies are drawn from a variety of industries including banking, healthcare and 
publishing. Three of the companies chose to early-adopt the provisions of SFAS 142 in 
the period before September 11, and eleven of the companies chose to early-adopt the 
provisions of SFAS in the period after September 11. Four of the companies chose to 
early-adopt the provisions of SFAS 142 in the period after September 11 and before 
announcement of the SEC’s formal investigation of Enron on October 31, and seven of 
the companies chose to early-adopt SFAS 142 subsequent to October 31. Prior to early 
adoption of SFAS 142, none of the sample companies were experiencing losses, although 
results for five of the companies were less favorable than in the prior year. 
  
Table 1 about here. 
 
Companies for whom early adoption of SFAS 142 led to a decrease in earnings 
include those whose earnings were significantly below the year ago period and chose to 
take a “big bath,” as well as companies whose earnings before the effects of the change 
were up significantly. In the case of the latter group, it is assumed that they decided it 
was an opportune time to make the change since the effects of the change would be 
negative and they had the earnings to absorb the charge at that time (i.e., income 
smoothing).   
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As previously mentioned, we also needed to consider the effect of the company’s 
size on the early adoption decision. The impact of early adoption of this particular 
standard varied significantly from industry to industry, with the likely greatest impact on 
those industries with significant recorded goodwill. Consequently, size by itself is not the 
variable of interest here, but rather size within a given industry. Industry leaders might 
have the financial resources to more easily early adopt a new standard than others within 
a given industry. As none of the sample companies was a clear leader within its industry, 
size did not seem to be a factor in the early adoption decision for SFAS 142.   
Findings 
Research Question 1. Research Question (RQ) 1 is concerned with the association 
between levels of market acceptance of “bad news” and managers’ propensity to early 
adopt the provisions of an accounting standard. To assess RQ 1, we examine differences 
in the companies who early adopt SFAS 142 in the pre- versus post-September 11th time 
periods.3 We find the three companies made the decision to early adopt in the pre-
September 11th period and four companies made the decision to early adopt in the post-
September 11th period. Further, three of the four companies that chose to early adopt in 
the post-September 11th time period reported positive income effects from such early 
adoption. This occurred during a period when the markets were presumably more 
disposed to accepting bad news. Accordingly, the data do not appear to provide support 
for RQ 1. 
Research Question 2. RQ 2 is concerned with the association between levels of 
investor tolerance for earnings management and managers’ propensity to early adopt the 
                                                 
3
 Note that we limit the post-September 11th period to the period prior to the SEC’s October 31 
announcement of a formal investigation into Enron to minimize potential confounding effects associated 
with differences in investors’ tolerance for earnings management in the pre/post-October 31 time periods. 
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provisions of an accounting standard. To assess RQ 2, we examine differences in the 
companies who early adopt SFAS 142 in the pre- versus post-October 31st time periods.4 
A comparison of the pre- and post- October 31 time periods again reveals little change in 
behavior. While three-fourths of the companies in the pre-October 31 period increased 
earnings by early adopting, nearly 60% of the companies in the post-October 31time 
period also increased reported earnings by the early adoption. 
Discussion 
 Clearly, the results are not conclusive, both as a result of the sample size, and 
because the early adoption window for SFAS 142 was still open at the time the sample 
was drawn. However, they do not support a “piling on” with bad news in the period 
following the September 11th attacks, nor do they support a reigning in of boosting 
earnings through earnings management in the period subsequent to the Enron collapse.  
Instead, in both periods, it seemed to be business as usual in that the lion’s share of the 
early adopters did so to boost reported earnings. 
An Evaluation of FASB’s Policy of Offering Extended Adoption Windows: 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Over the past several years, FASB has allowed multi-year adoption periods for 
many of its standards. However, by providing managers with multi-year adoption 
windows, FASB increases preparers’ ability to manage earnings (c.f., Gujarathi and 
Hoskin, 1992). Evidence in our exploratory study suggests that early adoption of 
standards to increase reported earnings persists, regardless of market expectations for bad 
news or investor intolerance for earnings management. This observed earnings 
                                                 
4
 Note that we limit the pre-October 31st period to the period subsequent to the September 11th terrorist 
attacks to minimize potential confounding effects associated with differences in market expectations for 
“bad news” in the pre/post-September 11 time periods. 
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management behavior appears to be sufficiently strong as to be unaffected by clearly 
important exogenous events, in this case, the September 11th attacks and the Enron 
collapse. Consistent with Healy and Wahlen (1999), these findings suggest that because 
of the costs and benefits associated with the managerial judgment process inherent in 
financial reporting, “It is therefore critical for standard setters to understand when 
standards that permit managers to exercise judgment in reporting increase the value of 
accounting information to users and when the standards reduce it” (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999: 369). Likewise, we believe it important for standard setters to consider when it 
appropriate to allow multi-period adoption windows. That is, perhaps one of the only 
ways to reign in artificial inflation of earnings through earnings management is to limit 
the tools with which companies can manage earnings – notably, by limiting the length of 
adoption windows and remove the opportunity for early adoption.   
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Table 1 
Sample of Companies Early Adopting SFAS 142 
 
 
 
Company 
 
Announcement 
Date 
GW 
Impairment 
Recorded* 
 
Income Effect of Early 
Adoption 
 
Pre-9/11 Period 
Independent 
Commercial Bank 
1/24/01 No Increase 
Airgas 8/13/01 Yes Decrease 
H&R Block 8/15/01 No Increase 
 
Post-9/1 Period; Pre-10/31 Period 
NCS Healthcare 11/02/01 No Increase 
Pervasive Software 10/16/01 Yes Decrease 
Readers’ Digest 10/31/01 No Increase 
American 
Healthways 
10/04/01 No Increase 
 
Post-10/31 Period 
Applied Industrial 
Technologies 
1/17/02 Yes Decrease 
NUI 1/15/02 Yes Decrease 
Key Technology 1/24/02 No Increase 
(Reduction of loss) 
Isle of Capri Casinos 1/27/02 No Increase 
Celadon 1/31/02 No Increase 
Infogrames 2/12/02 Yes Increase** 
BHA Group 2/22/02 Yes Decrease 
*Note all early adopters of SFAS 142 stopped amortizing goodwill. However, only some 
of the early adopters recorded impairments for goodwill.  
**Note that only a portion of Infogrames’ goodwill was impaired and so the increase to 
income resulting from discontinuing the amortization of goodwill exceeds the amount of 
the impaired goodwill that Infogrames wrote off. 
